How vulnerable is Europe’s satellite infrastructure to cyber and space threats?

Russian satellites maneuvering close to European spacecraft, potential eavesdropping on sensitive links, and a surprising revelation that parts of Europe’s orbital infrastructure still send data without strong encryption. These are not scenes from a science-fiction thriller, but concerns raised by recent reporting and cybersecurity experts.

To understand why space systems can be so exposed, and what this means for Europe’s security, we draw on insights from cybersecurity specialist Piotr Ciepiela, Partner at EY and head of Technology Consulting. His perspective reveals a rapidly expanding cyber domain that now reaches far beyond data centers and industrial plants—into Earth orbit itself.

Old space hardware in a new threat landscape

Many people assume that space technology is, by definition, cutting-edge. In practice, satellites are often based on designs that are many years old and must operate far longer than modern IT equipment. Once a satellite is launched, upgrading its hardware is almost impossible and software updates are tightly constrained.

This creates a stark contrast with cybersecurity, where threat actors, tools, and defensive techniques evolve at a dizzying pace. Systems that were considered reasonably secure at launch may become outdated long before the end of their orbital life. According to Ciepiela, this helps explain how some satellites— including those used for government and defense communications—can still rely on weak protection or even unencrypted transmissions.

The problem is amplified by the growing reliance of militaries on commercial space infrastructure. Historically, many space capabilities were developed in the military domain and later transferred to civilian use. Today the flow often runs in the opposite direction: armed forces are increasingly turning to commercially operated satellites and services to keep up with rapid innovation.

Why low Earth orbit changes the game

Modern satellite infrastructure spans three main orbital regimes:

• Geostationary orbit (GEO) – above roughly 35,000 km, where a small number of large satellites can cover most of the globe.
• Medium Earth orbit (MEO) – roughly 2,000–35,000 km, requiring a handful of spacecraft for global services.
• Low Earth orbit (LEO) – about 200–2,000 km above Earth, where constellations can consist of hundreds or even thousands of satellites.

GEO and MEO platforms are relatively few and individually expensive. In contrast, LEO systems have triggered a revolution: they use large numbers of comparatively cheaper satellites to deliver broadband connectivity, imaging, and other services.

Ciepiela notes that at today’s technological level, building and launching small satellites has become far more accessible. The result is a rapid proliferation of LEO spacecraft and a growing role for dual-use assets—civilian systems that are also leveraged for military or governmental purposes. But with this accessibility comes a widening attack surface, especially if security features were not a priority from the outset.

Beyond eavesdropping: the full spectrum of satellite threats

Public attention tends to focus on the possibility of satellites being used to intercept communications—an issue raised by reports that Russian spacecraft such as Luch-1 and Luch-2 have repeatedly approached Western satellites in orbit. However, interception is only one dimension of the risk.

According to Ciepiela, satellites and their supporting infrastructure can be targeted in multiple ways:

• Signal spoofing and jamming – Attackers can disrupt communications by overwhelming legitimate signals (jamming) or by imitating them (spoofing), potentially injecting false data or blocking real traffic.
• Command and control compromise – If adversaries gain access to a satellite’s control systems, they could alter its orbit, disable its payloads, manipulate data, or use it to generate misleading signals.
• Ground station attacks – Satellite operations depend on ground stations filled with computers, controllers, and networks. These facilities can be attacked using familiar tools such as malware, ransomware, or network intrusions.
• Network-layer intrusions – Data from satellites is routed through terrestrial networks. By infiltrating these networks, attackers may bypass both the spacecraft and ground control, inserting themselves into data flows as a man-in-the-middle or launching denial-of-service attacks.
• Launch and telemetry disruption – Telemetry links, launch facilities, and the wider space operations ecosystem are also potential targets, where interference could delay missions or compromise new satellites before they are fully operational.

The level of protection for each of these components varies widely. Many industrial and operational systems were historically secured by obscurity and physical isolation rather than by robust cyber defenses. When security experts eventually examined such environments—whether in refineries, power plants, or other critical infrastructure—they often found significant vulnerabilities that had gone unnoticed simply because nobody had tried to exploit them.

Regulation lag and fragmented responsibilities

Unlike some sectors of critical infrastructure, satellite systems and associated ground networks have not always been subject to harmonized cybersecurity regulation. As a result, security maturity can differ sharply between operators and countries.

Ciepiela points out that cyber risk in space must be viewed through the lens of a broad cyber-physical system: satellites, ground stations, launch facilities, and terrestrial networks all interact. Yet the legal and regulatory framework has not fully caught up with the realities of orbital operations.

This is particularly visible in the realm of international law. An incident such as a satellite deliberately or accidentally colliding with another raises complex questions: Is it an accident, negligence, or an act of aggression? How many “accidents” are tolerated before intent is assumed? As LEO constellations multiply, these questions become more urgent.

Space as the new frontier of cyber warfare

The digitalization of warfare has already pushed militaries to embrace data platforms, real-time intelligence, and rapid information sharing. In this context, satellite systems are a critical source of imagery, communications, and navigation data.

Ciepiela argues that cyber defense is now an integral part of modern military doctrine, intertwined with traditional concepts of sabotage, disruption, and espionage. Because so many essential services rely on dual-use space infrastructure, attacks on commercial systems can have strategic military consequences.

At the same time, civilian innovation has eroded the long-standing technological advantage of militaries in some areas. Instead of relying exclusively on purpose-built military platforms, armed forces increasingly integrate commercial satellites and cloud-like data services into their operations. This amplifies the importance of ensuring that commercial providers implement rigorous cybersecurity from the design phase rather than as an afterthought.

Europe’s push for a secure satellite communications system

The European Union has announced plans to deploy a new secure satellite communications system for government and defense users around the end of this decade. The stated goal is to provide a resilient, encrypted communications backbone for European institutions and member states.

From a technical standpoint, Ciepiela suggests such a system is feasible within a timeframe of a few years. But the more fundamental question is why Europe finds itself in a position where it must catch up now, and what happens in the meantime.

Currently, space-related security practices vary significantly across the EU. One member state may operate highly secured, encrypted systems, while another lags behind. If all 27 countries are interconnected through shared infrastructure, the weakest link can lower the collective level of protection.

This is where a common European standard and a centralized program can add value: by pooling funding, expertise, and governance to raise the baseline. Still, until a unified system is in place, governments must work with existing tools and legacy infrastructure, which often were not designed with today’s threat environment in mind.

Poland’s role in the emerging space cybersecurity ecosystem

Although Poland is not a traditional space power, it is part of the EU’s broader space and security agenda and has an expanding commercial space sector. Lower entry barriers mean that even smaller countries can participate in designing and building satellites or components, as well as in developing software and security solutions.

Ciepiela sees a strategic choice for countries like Poland: they can focus on manufacturing hardware, producing specific subsystems, developing software, or specializing in cybersecurity and operational logic for space systems. Given its strong pool of security professionals and engineering talent, Poland is well positioned to contribute in areas related to cyber defense and secure software.

As the EU shapes its long-term space and security strategy, member states will need to define where they add the most value. For Poland, that might mean becoming a key provider of cybersecurity expertise and secure digital technologies for the European space sector, rather than trying to compete as a full-spectrum space hardware producer.

From obscurity to resilience

The shift from viewing space infrastructure as niche and inherently protected to recognizing it as a mainstream cyber battleground mirrors a pattern seen in other industries. For years, many industrial systems were considered safe simply because they appeared isolated and rarely attracted attention. Once attackers began targeting them, their lack of preparedness became obvious.

Space is now undergoing a similar transition. As more public and private services depend on satellite connectivity and Earth observation, and as military operations rely on both dedicated and commercial space assets, the incentive for hostile actors to exploit weaknesses is only increasing.

For Europe, the challenge is to align technical innovation, regulatory frameworks, and defense planning. That means treating satellites and ground infrastructure as fully fledged elements of the cyber domain, applying proven security practices from IT and industrial control systems, and building new capabilities tailored to the unique constraints of space.